National Intelligence Daily

Saturday 19 April 1980

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
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IRAN	
The Revolutionary Council has ordered a crac ical activity in all universities.	kdown on polit-
The Council ordered all campus politiclose their offices within three days. The increasing clashes at Tehran's universitic lamic groups and leftists. The regime may advantage of the unrest to weaken two left that traditionally have strong student fol Mujahedin and Fedayeen.	ne move follows es between Is- nope to take eist groups
<u>Iran-Iraq</u>	
Continuing rumors of the execution in Ayatollah Baqr Sadr, a senior Iraqi Shia rare further aggravating relations between	eligious leader,
Baqr Sadr's death would lead t	co large anti-
The Kurdish Problem	
Fighting between dissident Kurds and has spread to one of the larger towns in K Tehran radio has confirmed press reports of Saqqez, a traditional Kurdish stronghold.	Kordestan Province.
Sanctions	
Japanese Foreign Minister Okita is fl bourg to be on hand for the EC Foreign Min that opens on Monday. An aid to Ohira exp Tokyo wants to make its decision on new me ing Iran in concert with the EC.	nisters' meeting Dlained that
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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS	
ISRAEL-LEBANON: UN Force Under Pressur	e
Continuing harassment of UN units in Leba	
backed Lebanese Christian militia leader Haddac	
major contributors to the UN force to become in of the Israelis and to blame the US for failing	
Israel.	, 00 put process 0 0.0
Attacks by militiamen on UN observ	
week and their apparent role in the mur	
soldiers yesterday will increase the antries that supply troops for the 6,000-	
Ireland and the Netherlands have alread	
the Israelis.	., p20001000 00
Other major contributorsincludin	
and Norwayalso are increasingly upset support for Haddad.	over israel's
The Israelis support Haddad becaus	e they believe
he supplies protection against Palestin	
filtrations that the UN force cannot pr	
of the UN force maintain, however, that	militia harass-
ment limits their ability to guard again	nst terrorist
attacks.	
the commando raid against	
base on the Lebanese coast yesterday wa	
preempt another planned guerrilla attac retaliation for the attack on a settlem	
	e first such Is-
raeli military action since last August	
return by the Israelis to a policy of t	
tive against the guerrillas.	

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EGYPT: Internal Security Problems	
The Egyptian Government apparently is greatly signs of domestic unrest, particularly dissent on puses.	
In a case pending since last August, belonging to the Communist underground wer Wednesday for organizing to overthrow the for distributing leaflets advocating Communisted allegedly received financial support from other Communist countries and from Libya. they are to be tried by the state security scores the government's concern.	re indicted on government and unism. They the USSR and The fact that
The government apparently is focusing bility of serious disturbances at the unit Although security on campuses is already sunprecedented level, the government report them until next month when final examinations.	versities. said to be at an cedly may close
We have no evidence of any links between Egypt and the recent activity of exiled tian Chief of Staff Shazli, who is visiting countries seeking support for Sadat's over is attracting some Arab backing for his "abut he has virtually no political following the state of the same are supported by the same ar	d former Egyp- ng radical Arab throw. Shazli national front,"

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
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USSR - SAUDI ARABIA: Examining Relations	3
Moscow remains interested in establishing r Saudi Arabia <u>despite the Saudi</u> reaction against t Afghanistan.	
The Soviets probably do not expect the near term. Soviet media, in contrast are criticizing Saudi domestic policies a support for the Afghan resistance.	to last year,
the issue of Afghani	
Soviet efforts to normalize relations with that it will lead to a significant erosic influence in the Middle East.	
Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, who has use of Afghanistan to quash all talk of improving with the USSR, would rebuff any Soviet or present. If new strains should occur in tions over the Palestinian issue, however determination to check the Soviets should weakening in the eyes of the Saudis, Fahowould come under new internal pressure to himself.	oving relations verture at US-Saudi rela- c, or if US d appear to be d probably

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ing to increase rural unrest.

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EL SALVADOR: Government Reforms Threater	ied
Junta efforts to broaden initial reforms reby continuing divisions in the government and incin the countryside.	
The junta has abandoned its earlier intends to announce a new phase of land rethat will benefit 150,000 sharecroppers. lack of consensus, administrative snarls, actions could neutralize reform efforts. Labor Minister Samayoa publicly attacked delaying labor reform.	edistribution Nonetheless, and leftist This week
Some liberal military officers also lusioned, although they lack essential su successful coup. Colonel Majano, the jurclosely linked to younger officers, is st from junta proceedings. His departure presult in other military and civilian resgive leftist forces a propaganda windfall	pport for a ta member most anding aloof obably would signations and
Because agrarian reform is the key to efforts to win public support, leftist gring much of their effort to rural areas. surgent organization murdered 25 peasants progovernment sympathies in a single day	oups are shift- The major in- suspected of
To help halt the bloodshed, the Churbegan talks with the junta and leftist le roadblocks to mediation were reflected in left leader's rejection of any dialogue. which participated in the first juntais toward a terrorist-allied government-in-e	aders. The one moderate His party now working
Negotiations to establish a shadow c will take several months, but increased i criticism of the juntatypified in recentacks by Nicaraguan leadersholds out thof formal recognition. In the meantime, left is likely to follow a dual trackpu with the Church to broaden its legitimacy	nternational tstrong at- e possibility the radical rsuing contacts

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CUBA: Mass Demonstrations

Fidel Castro's attempt to supervise personally all aspects of the refugee situation at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana underscores Cuba's concern over international criticism. Havana is defending its position with a massive propaganda counteroffensive portraying Cuba as the victim of a US-Peruvian-Venezuelan conspiracy. The effort will be led by government-instigated demonstrations today at the Peruvian and Venezuelan Embassies. Although the potential for violence exists, Havana probably will exercise tight control over the anticipated 1 million marchers.

In a declaration issued Wednesday, First Vice President Raul Castro noted that the Cuban people "calmly and firmly" reject the actions of the refugees--words previously used by the government to curb emotional behavior during demonstrations. In a related development, the airlift of Cubans to Costa Rica has been suspended, apparently because Havana wants the refugees flown directly to the countries accepting them.

CHINA-USSR: New Ambassador

China's new Ambassador to the USSR, Yang Shouzheng, is scheduled to arrive in Moscow tomorrow. Yang's party and diplomatic rank appear to reflect Beijing's interest in correct but sterile relations. Yang has long service in Africa, and we have no evidence that he ever specialized on Soviet issues. He may use his initial calls on senior Soviet officials to convey China's formal response to the proposal made by the USSR in early April for political or border negotiations. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's recent comments to the press indicate that Beijing will put Moscow off.

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
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ZAIRE: Student Disturbances	
Government troops have ended studen	t disturbances
in Kinshasa, but President Mobutu remain	
about the possibility of further unrest.	
plays of violence by the students and th	
Mobutu's resignation, Zairian troops occ	unied the
Kinshasa campus on Thursday, arrested so	
leaders, and forced the rest to leave.	
military units on alert and ordered the	Army to disperse
any student groups.	
The President believ	
fied politicians are manipulating the st	
hopes that the show of force will mainta	
will resist making major economic conces	sions to the
students for fear of encouraging other g	roups, including
teachers now on strike for higher pay, t	o make additional
demands.	

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INDONESIA: Aftermath of Anti-Chinese Incidents

Indonesian security authorities believe that the anti-Chinese rioting in the city of Udjung Pandang in eastern Indonesia on 10 and 11 April was caused by Muslim extremists trying to exploit anti-Chinese sentiment to attack President Suharto's government. They have warned student leaders -- the traditional instigators of urban violence--against trying to play on the disorders in Udjung Pandang and two other cities to incite trouble in The officials told the student leaders to bring their anti-Chinese grievances directly to Army headquarters and threatened that any looters of Chinese shops will be "shot on sight." The recently announced government program to accelerate naturalization of Indonesian Chinese probably focused attention on this group again and also aroused latent resentment among the Indonesian public. The security officials worry that government opponents will try to build on these feelings and translate racial discontent into antigovernment violence.

SOUTH KOREA: Student Unrest

Student demonstrations in Seoul and other major cities can gain new impetus this weekend, the 20th anniversary of the student uprising that led to the overthrow of the Syngman Rhee government. Although recent protests have been small and nonviolent, normal university functions have been paralyzed on a score of campuses, and President Choi Kyu Hah has appealed for student restraint. Army strongman Chun Doo Hwan believes that recent student opposition to compulsory military training gives comfort to North Korea and endangers national security. If university authorities appear unable to resolve the issue, the government might abandon its hands-off policy and threaten to draft dissenters or deny diplomas to student who lack the required military credits.

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USSR-BR	AZIL: Toward Closer Relati	ons
Soviet head of on what is a si Preside	uard Shevardnadze, a candid Politburo, arrived in Brazi a parliamentary delegation otherwise could have been gnificant gesture to the Brat Figueiredo to visit Mosc	I this week as the I. His inclusion a routine delegation Tazilians. He invited
Soviet head of on what is a si Preside	Politburo, arrived in Brazi a parliamentary delegation otherwise could have been gnificant gesture to the Br	I this week as the I. His inclusion a routine delegation Tazilians. He invited
Soviet head of on what is a si Preside year. exploit ent to	Politburo, arrived in Brazi a parliamentary delegation otherwise could have been gnificant gesture to the Br nt Figueiredo to visit Mosc The Sov Brazil's belief that it mu the US, particularly in the	I this week as the A. His inclusion A routine delegation Azilians. He invited Cow, probably next riets probably want to Ast not appear subservi- E wake of Brasilia's
Soviet head of on what is a si Preside year. exploit ent to	Politburo, arrived in Brazi a parliamentary delegation otherwise could have been gnificant gesture to the Br nt Figueiredo to visit Mosc The Sov Brazil's belief that it mu	I this week as the A. His inclusion A routine delegation Azilians. He invited Cow, probably next riets probably want to Ast not appear subservi- E wake of Brasilia's

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
PAKISTAN: The Afghanistan Debate
Pakistan continues to insist that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is a precondition for any improvement in its relations with either country. Islamabad's position is under constant review, however, and President Zia is subject to conflicting pressures from within his government. Some officials favor opposing the Soviets more strongly; others want to appease Moscow.
Zia and his advisers are worried about Moscow's long-term objectives in the subcontinent and about the serious problems Pakistan faces in the short term as the Soviets try to pacify Afghanistan. Some advisers believe that a continued influx of refugees could soon lead to a serious breakdown of law and order along the frontier.
Diplomatic Tightrope Islamabad has taken a strong diplomatic stand against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but it is trying to avoid giving unnecessary offense to Moscow. Zia rejected US aid primarily because he believed that accepting it would increase tension with Moscow but would not strengthen Pakistan's security to a corresponding degree.

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Islamabad's desire to avoid confrontation with Moscow is further reflected in its reluctance to back publicly exile groups in Pakistan and its unwillingness to give extensive help to Afghan insurgents. Pakistan also has tended to avoid publicity on border incidents, including Soviet overflights.

Zia and his advisers nevertheless are not seeking an accommodation with Moscow. Pakistan's closest allies-Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China--would have serious reservations about any significant move toward Moscow. At home, many Pakistanis--especially the conservatives supporting Zia--would oppose abandoning fellow Muslims in Afghanistan or any "sellout" to the USSR.

Pakistani policymakers doubt, moreover, that any agreement with Moscow would bring more than temporary benefits. There also is considerable sentiment in the military-on which Zia ultimately depends--for a continued hardline on Afghanistan.

Pakistani leaders seem to agree on their sense of isolation while facing the Soviets. This has led them to an unprecedented interest in trying to improve relations with India despite longstanding deep distrust of India's intentions and of its relationship with Moscow.

Domestic Politics

Although foreign developments and the extent of foreign support will strongly influence Pakistani policy, domestic politics could become an equally important factor. The near automatic support that Zia received after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--even from many of his political enemies--is beginning to dissipate.

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Former Prime Minister Bhutto's widow has publicly attacked Zia for failing to accept the Soviet-installed Babrak government and for allowing insurgents to use Pakistani territory. Many Islamabad officials, on the other hand, believe that any attempt to placate the Soviets could turn many in the Army against Zia.

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